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Abstract
This work considers optimization problems under Rawls and maximin with mul-
tiple discount factors criteria. It proves that though these criteria are different,
they have the same optimal value and solution.
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1 Introduction
Consider the following classical question: given a stock of a renewable resource,
what would be the best inter-temporal exploitation of it, considering the welfare
of both current and future generations?
The famous Ramsey criterion, which uses a constant discount rate and is used
largely in research into economic dynamics, is criticized for its weak weighting
parameters for generations in the distant future. The evaluation of each utilities
stream is quasi-determined by a finite number of generations. This raises the
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edges the LABEX MME-DII (ANR-11-LBX-0023-01) for supports during the completion of this
work.
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concerns that following the Ramsey criterion, the economy does not leave enough
resource for the future.
In the classical work "Theory of justice", Rawls [17] assumes that if one is hidden
behind a veil of ignorance, with total lack of information about the condition into
which she1 will be born, the economic agent should choose the maximization of
the least favoured generation. Specifically, given a inter-temporal consumption
streams, her evaluation criterion of inter-temporal utilities streams should be
U(c0, c1, c2, . . . ) = inf
s≥0
u(cs),
where u(ct) is the utility of the t
th generation, given ct as the consumed resource.
We can consider the Rawls’s question in another way: the economic agent may
be ambiguous about what is the "good" discount factor to choose in evaluating
utilities streams. Her set of possible discount factors is (0, 1). Having total lack
of information, for a given consumption stream {cs}
∞
s=0, she should evaluate it as
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U(c0, c1, c2, . . . ) = inf
δ∈(0,1)
[
(1− δ)
∞∑
s=0
δsu(cs)
]
.
This criterion can also be considered as an application of Rawls’s spirit in the
configuration where disagreements exists between people in the economy about
how to discount the future. The social planer choose a criterion that maximizes
the least favoured person.
Naturally, this raises the question of the behaviour of the economy under the Rawls
criteria. The first Rawls criterion is well studied in the seminar contributions of
Arrow [2], Solow [15] and Calvo [4]. The result is clear: the behaviour of the
economy depends strongly on the initial stock. If the stock of a renewable resource
is below the golden rule (the level of stock allowing a maximal level of constant
consumption), the optimal exploitation strategy is to ensure that the stock remains
1We use female pronouns as a convenient default.
2For the axiomatic foundation and discussion about the importance of the normalizing term
1 − δ, see Chambers & Echenique [5] and Drugeon & al [9]. Observe that for any 0<δ< 1, we
have (1− δ)
∑
∞
s=0
δs = 1.
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constant over time. In the case of abundant stock of a renewable resource, which
is higher than the golden rule, there is an infinite number of solutions and every
optimal path converges decreasingly to this level.
The purpose of this work is to study the same question under the second Rawls
criterion. We prove that for a low level of resource stock (under the golden rule),
the unique solution is to keep the stock constant through time. Moreover, the
solutions under the two criteria coincide. For the case where the resource is abun-
dant, the solution under the first criterion is the one under the second, and the
value functions are equal.
This work is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the two Rawlsian problems
and the main properties of the first one and solves the second one. Section 3
discusses different criterion studied in the literature.
2 The two Rawlsian criteria
2.1 Fundamentals
Denote by u the instantaneous utility function and f the regeneration function of
the renewable resource. These two functions are supposed to be strictly increasing
and concave. The concavity of the utility function is strict. To simplify the
presentation, suppose that f ′(0)> 1
δ
and f ′(∞)< 1.
Denote by x the golden rule, the capital accumulation corresponding to the max-
imum level of constant consumption: this value x is solution to the equation
f ′(x) = 1.
For any given capital stock x0 ≥ 0, denote by Π(x0) the set of feasible paths of
stock {xs}
∞
s=0: for any s, 0 ≤ xs+1 ≤ f(xs).
For each discount rate 0<δ < 1, it is well known in dynamic programming litera-
ture3 that the optimal capital accumulation path corresponding to δ is monotonic
3See Stokey, Lucas with Prescott [16].
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and converges to xδ, the solution to the equation f ′(x) = 1
δ
.
For each feasible stock path x = {xs}
∞
s=0, the inter-temporal evaluation of the
corresponding consumption path {cs}
∞
s=0 with cs = f(xs)− xs+1 for any s ≥ 0, is
given as
ν(x) = inf
s≥0
u(cs).
2.2 The classical Rawls criterion
The famous Rawls criterion, embedded in the optimal growth context, can be
considered as the following optimization problem, which is well studied in Arrow
[2], Solow [15] and Calvo [4]. The economic agent solves:
max
[
inf
s≥0
u(cs)
]
,
under the constraint ct + xs+1 ≤ f(xs) for all s, with x0 > 0 given.
The Lemma 2.1 establishes the foundation for the existence of optimal solution
and fundamental properties of the value function.
Lemma 2.1. i) For any x0 ≥ 0, the set of feasible paths Π(x0) is compact in
product topology.
ii) The function ν is upper semi-continuous for the product topology.
iii) There exists x∗ ∈ Π(x0) such that
ν
(
x
∗
)
= max
x∈Π(x0)
ν
(
x
)
.
Proposition 2.1 gives the behaviour of the optimal path, which depends strongly
on the initial condition, with the golden rule x as the critical threshold.
Proposition 2.1. i) Consider the case 0 ≤ x0 ≤ x. The problem has unique
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solution x∗ = (x0, x0, . . .) and
max
x∈Π(x0)
ν(x) = ν(x∗)
= u (f(x0)− x0) .
ii) Consider x0>x. The problem has an infinite number of solutions which all
converge to x. And
max
x∈Π(x0)
ν(x) = u (f(x)− x) .
For initial capital stock x0 smaller than x, the optimal choice is to remain in the
status quo. The unique solution x∗ satisfies x∗s = x0 for any s ≥ 0. The optimal
value is u (f(x0)− x0). For x0 bigger than x, there exists an infinite number
of solution, every optimal stock path converges to x and the optimal value is
u (f(x)− x).
2.3 The second Rawlsian criterion and the equivalence
between the two criteria
In [9], Drugeon & al consider the optimization problem with multiple discount
factors under the maximin criteria. Let D= [δ, δ] representing the set of possible
discount factors, the economic agent solves:
maxmin
δ∈D
[
(1− δ)
∞∑
s=0
δsu(cs)
]
s.c cs + xs+1 ≤ f(xs) for any s,
x0 is given.
For each feasible stock path x = {xs}
∞
s=0, let cs = f(xs)− xs+1 for any s ≥ 0 and
νˆ(x) = inf
0<δ< 1
[
(1− δ)
∞∑
s=0
δsu(cs)
]
.
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As the functions u and f satisfy the standard conditions in growth theory, for
each discount factor δ, the optimal path of the Ramsey problem corresponding to
δ converges monotonically to xδ the solution to
f ′(x) =
1
δ
.
Moreover, it is easy to verify that
lim
δ→0
xδ = 0,
lim
δ→1
xδ = x.
Proposition 2.2 gives a detailed description of the optimal path under the multiple
discount factors and the second Rawlsian criterion.
Proposition 2.2. Assume that 0<δ ≤ δ < 1. Denote by χ∗ the unique optimal
path for the maximin problem.
i) For x0 ≤ x
δ, χ∗ coincides with the optimal path of the Ramsey problem with
discount factor δ, is increasing and converges to xδ.
ii) For xδ ≤ x0 ≤ x
δ, for any s, x∗s = x0. The optimal path χ
∗ coincides with the
optimal solution of Ramsey problem with discount factor δ satisfying xδ = x0.
iii) For x0 ≥ x
δ, χ∗ coincides with the optimal path of the Ramsey problem with
discount factor δ, is decreasing and converges to xδ.
Figure 1, taken from Drugeon & al [9], provides an illustration of the dependence of
optimal paths in initial condition. The functions ϕδ and ϕδ represent respectively
the optimal policy functions for the Ramsey problems with the discount factors δ
et δ.
By technical difficulties relying with the fixed point arguments, Drugeon & al [9]
assume that D is a closed set belonging to (0, 1): 0<δ ≤ δ < 1. Intuitively, under
the result in Proposition 2.2 we can hope that for D= (0, 1): δ converges to zero,
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Figure 1: The optimal policy function in multiple discount factors configuration
and δ converges to 1, the two Ralwsian problems have the same value function:
for D= (0, 1), we get max
x∈Π(x0) ν(x) = maxx∈Π(x0) νˆ(x).
Proposition 2.3. For any x0 ≥ 0,
i) We have
max
χ∈Π(x0)
inf
s≥0
u
(
f(xs)− xs+1
)
= max
χ∈Π(x0)
[
inf
0<δ<1
(1− δ)
∞∑
s=0
u
(
f(xs)− xs+1
)]
.
ii) For 0 ≤ x0 ≤ x, the two Rawlsian problems have the same solution x
∗ =
(x0, x0, x0, . . . ).
iii) For x0>x, every solution under the first Rawlsian criterion is a solution
under the second one.
Proof. (i) To facilitate the exposition, for each 0<δ < 1, denote by {xs(δ)}
∞
s=0 the
optimal path of Ramsey problem corresponding to the discount factor δ.
Observe that for any feasible path of stock {xs}
∞
s=0 belonging to Π(x0):
inf
s≥0
u
(
f(xs)− xs+1
)
≤ inf
0<δ< 1
[
(1− δ)
∞∑
s=0
δsu
(
f(xs)− xs+1
)]
.
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This implies
max
χ∈Π(x0)
min
s≥0
u
(
f(xs)− xs+1
)
≤ max
χ∈Π(x0)
[
inf
0<δ<1
(1− δ)
∞∑
s=0
δsu
(
f(xs)− xs+1
)]
.
Now we will prove the converse inequality.
Consider first the case 0<x0<x. Fix 0<δ < δ < 1 such that x
δ <x0<x
δ.
Define χ∗ = (x0, x0, . . . ), which is the unique optimal path for the maximin cri-
terion with the set of discount rates D = [δ, δ]. For any feasible path χ 6= χ∗,
following Drugeon & al [9], we have
inf
0<δ<1
[
(1− δ)
∞∑
s=0
u
(
f(xs)− xs+1
)]
≤ inf
δ≤δ≤δ
[
(1− δ)
∞∑
s=0
u
(
f(xs)− xs+1
)]
< inf
δ≤δ≤δ
[
(1− δ)
∞∑
s=0
u
(
f(x∗s)− x
∗
s+1
)]
= u
(
f(x0)− x0
)
= max
χ∈Π(x0)
[
inf
s≥0
u
(
f(xs)− xs+1
)]
.
This implies that the two Rawlsian problems have the same maximum value and
unique solution χ∗.
Now consider the case x0 > x. The idea of the proof is that for any δ, the sequence
{xs(δ)}
∞
s=0 converges to x
δ with a speed that is sufficiently high and independent
with the choice of δ.
We prove that for any ǫ > 0, there exists T (ǫ) such that for any T ≥ T (ǫ), any
0 < δ < 1, we have
xδ < xT (δ)<x+ ǫ.
For each 0<δ < 1, consider a time s satisfying x0 ≥ x1(δ) ≥ · · · ≥ xs+1(δ) ≥ x+ ǫ.
Observe that f ′(x+ ǫ) < 1. Let f ′(x+ ǫ) = 1− ǫ1, with ǫ1> 0.
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By Euler equations, we have
u′
(
f(xs(δ))− xs+1(δ)
)
= δu′
(
f(xs+1(δ))− xs+2(δ)
)
f ′(xs+1(δ))
≤ u′
(
f(xs+1(δ))− xs+2(δ)
)
f ′(xs+1(δ))
≤ u′
(
f(xs+1(δ))− xs+2(δ)
)
f ′(x+ ǫ)
≤ u′
(
f(xs+1(δ))− xs+2(δ)
)
− ǫ1u
′
(
f(xs+1(δ))− xs+2(δ)
)
≤ u′
(
f(xs+1(δ))− xs+2(δ)
)
− ǫ2,
for ǫ2 = ǫ1u
′
(
f(x0)
)
, since f(x0) ≥ f(xs+1(δ))−xs+2(δ). Observe that ǫ2 does not
depend on δ.
We then deduce
ǫ2 ≤ u
′
(
f(xs+1(δ))− xs+2(δ)
)
− u′
(
f(xs(δ))− xs+1(δ)
)
= u′′(ξ)
[(
f(xs+1(δ))− xs+2(δ)
)
−
(
f(xs(δ))− xs+1(δ)
)]
= (−u′′(ξ))
[(
f(xs(δ))− xs+1(δ)
)
−
(
f(xs+1(δ))− xs+2(δ)
)]
,
with some f(xs+1(δ))− xs+2(δ) ≤ ξ ≤ f(xs(δ))− xs+1(δ). This implies
xs+1(δ)− xs+2(δ) ≤ f(xs(δ))− f(xs+1(δ))−
ǫ2
−u′′(ξ)
.
As xs+1(δ) ≥ x+ ǫ, it is easy to verify that
f(x+ ǫ)− xǫ ≤ f(xs+1(δ))− xs+2(δ)
≤ ξ
≤ f(xs(δ))− xs+1(δ)
≤ f(x0).
Let
a = sup
f(x+ǫ)−xǫ≤ξ≤f(x0)
(−u′′(ξ)),
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and
ǫ3 =
ǫ2
a
.
The value ǫ3 is strictly positive and is independent with respect to δ. Moreover,
xs+1(δ)− xs+2(δ) ≤ f(xs(δ))− f(xs+1(δ))− ǫ3
≤ f ′(xs+1(δ))(xs(δ)− xs+1(δ))− ǫ3
≤ xs(δ)− xs+1(δ)− ǫ3.
Hence for T (ǫ) big enough such that x0 − T (ǫ)ǫ3 < 0, we have xT (δ) < x + ǫ for
any T ≥ T (ǫ) and for any 0<δ < 1. Otherwise we will have xT (δ)− xT+1(δ) ≤ 0
for some T ≥ T (ǫ): a contradiction4.
By the independence of T (ǫ) in respect to δ, combining with result that for s ≥
T (ǫ), we have xδ ≤ xs(δ) ≤ x+ ǫ, we get the following inequality:
lim
δ→1
[
(1− δ)
∞∑
s=0
δsu
(
f(xs(δ))− xs+1(δ)
)]
= lim
δ→1

(1− δ) T (ǫ)∑
s=0
δsu
(
f(xs(δ))− xs+1(δ)
)
+ lim
δ→1

δT (ǫ)+1(1− δ) ∞∑
s=T (ǫ)+1
δs−T (ǫ)−1u
(
f(xs(δ))− xs+1(δ)
)
= lim
δ→1

δT (ǫ)+1(1− δ) ∞∑
s=T (ǫ)+1
δs−T (ǫ)−1u
(
f(xs(δ))− xs+1(δ)
)
≤ lim
δ→1
u
(
f(x+ ǫ)− xδ
)
= u
(
f(x+ ǫ)− x
)
.
4It is well known that the solution of Ramsey problem converges monotonically to the steady
state.
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For any feasible path χ ∈ Π(x0),
inf
0<δ<1
[
(1− δ)
∞∑
s=0
u
(
f(xs)− xs+1
)]
≤ inf
0≤δ≤1
[
(1− δ)
∞∑
s=0
δsu
(
f(xs(δ))− xs+1(δ)
)]
≤ lim
δ→1
[
(1− δ)
∞∑
s=0
δsu
(
f(xs(δ))− xs+1(δ)
)]
≤ u
(
f(x+ ǫ)− x
)
.
Since ǫ > 0 is chosen arbitrarily, this implies
inf
0<δ<1
[
(1− δ)
∞∑
s=0
u
(
f(xs)− xs+1
)]
≤ u
(
f(x)− x
)
.
We then have
max
x∈Π(x0)
ν(x) = max
x∈Π(x0)
νˆ(x) = u
(
f(x)− x
)
.
For a solution of the problem with the second Rawlsian criterion, take for example
the sequence χˆ ∈ Π(x0) such that xˆs = x for any s ≥ 1. For each δ,
(1− δ)
∞∑
s=0
u
(
f(xˆs)− xˆs+1
)
= (1− δ)u
(
f(x0)− x
)
+ δu
(
f(x)− x
)
.
Since x0>x, the function (1− δ)u
(
f(x0)−x
)
+ δu
(
f(x)−x
)
is strictly decreasing
in respect to δ. This implies
inf
0<δ<1
[
(1− δ)
∞∑
s=0
δsu
(
f(xˆs)− xˆs+1
)]
= lim
δ→1
[
(1− δ)
∞∑
s=0
δsu
(
f(xˆs)− xˆs+1
)]
= u
(
f(x)− x
)
.
(ii) This property is proven using the same the arguments as part (i).
(iii) Consider some feasible path x∗ which is a solution of the problem under first
Rawls criterion. Since u
(
f(x∗s) − x
∗
s+1) ≥ u
(
f(x) − x) for any s ≥ 0, for any
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0<δ < 1,
(1− δ)
∞∑
s=0
δsu
(
f(x∗s)− x
∗
s+1
)
≥ u
(
f(x)− x
)
.
This implies
inf
0<δ< 1
[
(1− δ)
∞∑
s=0
δsu
(
f(x∗s)− x
∗
s+1
)]
≥ u
(
f(x)− x
)
= max
x∈Π(x0)
inf
0<δ< 1
[
(1− δ)
∞∑
s=0
δsu
(
f(xs)− xs+1
)]
.
Hence x∗ is a solution of the problem under second Rawls criterion. The proof is
completed. QED
3 Discussions
3.1 Rawls criteria and ambiguity aversion
In recent decades, a large body of literature has risen in decision theory, enlarging
the world of Savage [18], where the famous sure-thing princple is not satisfied. The
seminar contribution of Gilboa & Schmeidler [11] considers the behaviour under
which the economic agent maximizes the worst scenario. This allows us to make
a link to the Rawlsian criteria. Assume that the economic agent must choose a
time discounting system to evaluate the inter-temporal consumption streams. The
set of possible time discounting is ∆ = (π0, π1, π2, . . . ) such that πs> 0 for any s
and
∑∞
s=0 πs = 1. Behind the veil of ignorance, every time discounting system is
possible. Hence, the criterion under ambiguity aversion is
U(c0, c1, c2, . . . ) = inf
π∈∆
[
∞∑
s=0
πsu(cs)
]
= inf
s≥0
u(cs),
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which is the first Ralws criterion.
Now assume that the economic agent is just ambiguous about the set of time
discounting systems satisfying the usual properties as impatience, and stability.
Let D be that set. In Chambers & Echenique [5], we found that:
D= {π ∈ ∆ such that ∃δ ∈ (0, 1) : πs = (1− δ)δ
s for all s ≥ 0} .
The criterion is then the second Rawlsian one.
3.2 Disussion about some criteria
The Ramsey criterion is criticized about putting privileges for the generations in
present and close future. In another way, other criteria, for example the lim inf
take into account only the distant future. As a way to reconcile these to extremes,
Chichilnisky in [6], [7] proposes a criterion satisfying her No-dictatorship of present
and of future. Her criterion is a convex combination of a Ramsey part and a lim inf
part5. The weakness of this criterion is that, being the convex sum of two parts
which are continuous in respect to different topologies, the optimization problem
under this criterion generally has no solution. It is always difficult taking into
account at the same time the efficiency and the equality.
As a response for this challenge, Alvarez-Cuadrado & Van Long [1] consider the
convex combination between a Ramsey part and a Rawlsian part, in the contin-
uous time configuration. They give a detailed description of the behaviour of the
economy 6. Another approach belongs to Asheim & Ekeland [3], who consider the
markovian solutions of the problem under Chichilnisky’s criterion, and prove that
the lim inf part has no effect on the optimal choice.
The overtaking criterion of Gale satisfies the two non-dictatorship properties of
Chichilnisky, but this criterion is not complete. If we focus only on the good
programs, as in Dana & Le Van [8], the optimal path converges to the golden rule.
5For a discussion about Chichilnisky’s criterion, see Alvarez-Cuadrado & Van Long [1].
6For the discrete time configuration, see Ha-Huy & Nguyen [12].
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As an attempt to avoid the non-completeness problem, Le Van & Morhaim [14]
consider the Ramsey problem and study the properties of the solution when the
discount rate converges to 1. They prove that the sequence of solutions converge
to the solution of problem under Gale’s criterion.
3.3 Technical concerns
The result for the first Rawlsian criterion is based only on the concavity of the
function f , and does not impose any condition on the utility function u. However,
in order to apply results in dynamic programming literature, for solving the prob-
lem under the second Rawlsian criterion, we must assume the concavity property
for utility function.
And, consider the case where f ′(∞) ≥ 1. Under this assumption, x = ∞. For
the two Rawlsian criteria, for any initial stock of resource, the only solution is to
remains constant. The only remark is that since the feasible paths could be un-
bounded, we must assume conditions ensuring the determination of value function
and its continuity. For the details, curious readers can refer to the article of Le
Van & Morhaim [13], with the most important condition being tail insensitivity
property.
And if f ′(0) ≤ 1, every feasible path converges to zero, the two problems become
trivial.
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